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1. Introduction 
Despite the fact that Turkey has the 17th largest economy in the world and the 6th largest 
economy in the European Union (EU), its financial system is still relatively small compared 
to most of the EU countries (State Planning Organisation, 2009). Even though increased 
competition has been monitored over the last decade particularly due to removal of barriers 
on foreign entry into the Turkish banking sector, there are still doubts on Turkey’s 
competitive strength with the EU countries. What is important is that financial performance 
of institutions has become a primary concern of investors, lenders, shareholders, and in 
particular to managers, in planning and controlling their activities. We believe, financial 
progress since the 2000-01 twin crises, enforcement of internationally accepted banking 
regulatory and supervisory standards, for instance Basel I and II, as well as implementation 
of macroeconomic reforms increased stability and trust in Turkey. We expect these 
developments to have positive impact on bank performances attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to the banking sector and as a result increase transfer of know how and 
apllication of new technological advances.  
Above all the most imperative occurrence, not only for Turkish banking but also for Turkey 
as a nation, is the declaration of it as an EU accession country in 2005. After more than four 
decades of long standing negotiations, Turkey finally became a candidate member of the EU 
and thus required to adjust its legislation and regulatory environment to that of the EU by 
adapting the EU acquis communautaire during the convergence process.1 The current 
government carried out a constitutional revolution: deepening and widening democratic 
freedoms, introducing minority rights for the Kurds and, above all, starting to subordinate 
                                                 
1 One of the most important items in the acquis on financial institutions is the harmonization of capital 
adequacy regulations. The latest EU directive that sets out the capital adequacy framework is the 
Capital Adequacy Directive 3 (CAD 3). CAD 3, which took effect in 2007 and applied to all credit 
institutions in the EU, simply translates Basel II into EU legislation. The adaptation of a Basel II type 
regulatory framework for financial institutions by the EU facilitated Turkey’s efforts to comply with this 
section of the acquis, as Turkish authorities already opt to implement Basel II provisions fully as of 
January 2008 for capital adequacy requirements. In fact, capital adequacy requirements in Turkey were 
already established inline with Basel I (adopted in 1989) and market risk was incorporated in the 
calculation of capital adequacy ratio in 2002. 
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Turkey’s army to civilian authority. In fact, the European project worked as a powerful 
engine of reform and helped glue together Turkey’s political tribes. We believe the ultimate 
hope of EU membership is an important factor on augmented FDI and would make Turkey 
even more attractive for foreign investors in the near future. This is due to the fact that 
Turkey has a highly skilled and adaptable labor force, a large domestic market, and the 
advantage of geographic closeness to Europe, Middle East, Northern Africa, and Central 
Asia markets.  
The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008 released by the World Economic Form listed 
Turkey in the 53rd place among 131 countries in the overall ranking (six step going up from 
2006). Moreover, Turkey is listed as the 13th most attractive country in the world for FDI, thus 
it is not surprising to have approximately 53 per cent of total banking assets held by foreign 
investors (BRSA, 2007). Since 2005, numerous leading banks in the global arena, particularly 
with European origin, raised their shareholdings in large and medium sized Turkish 
commercial banks. For instance, 42 per cent stake of Turkiye Ekonomi Bankası (TEB) bought 
by France’s BNP Paribas in 2005, followed by 89 per cent stake acquisition of Dışbank by 
Belgium’s Fortis bank, 5.5 per cent share sale of Garanti Bankası to the US General Electric 
Consumer Finance, and 50 per cent stake sale of Yapı Kredi Bankası to Italy’s UniCredito. 
Even though massive progress has been achieved in terms of foreign inflows over the recent 
years, Turkey still ranks as one of the bottom compared to the EU emerging countries. The 
28.7 percent average share of foreign participation in the EU-27 as well as Bulgarian (93 per 
cent) and Romanian (94 per cent) banking sectors is well above the level in Turkey (24.8 per 
cent). This is supportive of the argument by Steinherr et al. (2004) that Eastern European 
countries did not have any historical commercial banking activity when they opened up 
their markets and the most efficient option of quickly transforming their banking system 
was to invite foreign banks as strategic investors. In contrast, Turkish banking sector has 
long been established with domestic banks and provides the foreign banks with one 
representative office in order to help manage their activities. Additionally, legal 
uncertainties, family ownership of private banks, and relationship lending practices in 
Turkey could be other concerns of foreign investors over the past decades.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by implying that technology transfer associated 
with inward FDI yields higher bank productivity. More generally, analysing the dynamic 
effects of foreign presence may be important in seeking answers to some of the relevant 
questions about effects of FDI on host country banking industries and technology transfers. 
It is interesting to illustrate that even though research on transition economies has been 
growing, studies on Turkish banking sector lag far behind. None of the studies revised in 
the literature identified productivity differences among foreign invested and domestic 
banks in Turkey as well as not examining the most recent periods. What distinguishes this 
study from the rest in the literature is its comphrehensive analysis of issues specified in 
various individual studies. The literature is extended in this study by analysing the impact 
of foreign ownership on the DEA Malmquist productivity scores and its decomposed 
components. Hence, informtion on bank technical efficiency change (TEC), pure efficiency 
change (PEC), technological change (TC), scale efficiency change (SEC) as well as total factor 
productivity change (TFPC) over the analysis period would be valueable and may serve to 
inform the relative effect of increased FDI in the market as Turkey is considered as a 
potential EU member.  
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This study focuses on 17 commercial banks operating in Turkey from which more than half 
of them received foreign investment since 2001. The ‘first-stage’ analysis has been 
introduced with an application of the input oriented DEA Malmquist index. The ‘second-
stage’ analysis tests the impact of bank specific variables as well as several dummy vaiables 
on the decomposed DEA Malmquist index components following the studies by Delis et al. 
(2008), Mukerjee et al. (2001), Dogan & Fauesten (2003), Pasiouras et al. (2007), and Lensink et 
al. (2008). Regarding foreign bank entry, we expect to find evidence that productivity of 
domestic banks have increased particularly due to developments in application of 
technological advances. 
In the next section, long standing negotiations between the EU and Turkey as well as the 
probable outcome of Turkey’ EU membership both in politcal and economic grounds is 
summarised. In section 3, a summary of relevant studies in the literature is introduced 
followed by description of the data in section 4. Section 5 characterizes firstly the 
methodology of decomposing DEA-Malmquist productivity measures into its relevant 
components and secondly how the estimated bank TFP change scores as well its 
decomposed components are related to relevant bank specific factors in the second stage 
regressions. Section 6 summarises the empirical findings followed by conclusions in 
section 7. 
2. Long-standing negotiations and impact of Turkey’s probable EU 
membership 
The EU has gone through a massive enlargement process in 2004 by inclusion of ten new 
countries in its body followed by Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Turkey attached particular 
importance to the EU's recent enlargement process for two main reasons: (i) playing an 
active role in the ex-Soviet bloc as a trade partner, and (ii) the Association Agreement 
between Turkey and the EU guarantees its full EU membership. In fact, Turkey was one of 
the first candidate countries applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC), in 
July 1959, shortly after its creation in 1958. The response from the EEC was a suggestion to 
establish an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the EEC, i.e. the Ankara 
Agreement (1963), until circumstances in Turkey permit its accession.2  
After pursuing inward-oriented development strategies throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
Turkey switched over to a more outward-oriented policy stance in 1980 aiming to integrate 
the country into the EU. Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, whilst received a 
response in 1990 stating that accession negotiations could not be undertaken at the time as 
the EU was engaged in major internal changes (adoption of the Single Market), and 
developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, the EU was prepared to 
extend and deepen economic relations with Turkey without rejecting the possibility of full 
membership at a future date and the Commission underpinned the need for a 
comprehensive cooperation program to facilitate integration of the two sides as well as 
finalizing the Customs Union by 1995.  
                                                 
2 The Ankara Agreement aimed at securing Turkey’s full membership in the EEC through the 
establishment of a customs union in economic and trade mattters in three phases, which still constitutes 
the legal basis of the Association. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Technological Change 
 
176 
At the Association Council of 29 April 1997, the EU reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility for 
membership and asked the Commission to prepare recommendations to deepen the Turkey-
EU relations, while claiming that the development of this relationship depends on a number 
of issues relating to Greece, Cyprus and human rights. The Commission, however, excluded 
Turkey from the enlargement process in its report entitled "Agenda 2000" disclosed on 16 
July 1997, which may be seen as a contradiction. The report granted that the Customs Union 
was functioning satisfactorily and that it had demonstrated Turkey's ability to adapt to the 
EU norms in many areas, whilst porposed a number of recommendations on liberalization 
of trade in services, consumer protection and a number of political issues as pre-conditions 
for moving the relations forward.  
On December 10–11, 1999, the European Council meeting held in Helsinki produced a 
breakthrough in Turkey-EU relations, where Turkey was officially recognized as a 
candidate country for accession and signed an Accession Partnership with the EU. 
However, contrary to other candidate countries (EU-103, Bulgaria and Romania), Turkey did 
not receive a timetable for accession. After the approval of the Accession Partnership by the 
Council and adoption of the Framework Regulation on February 26, 2001, the Turkish 
government announced on March 19, 2001, its own National Program for adoption of the 
acquis communautaire. Since then, progress toward accession continues along the path set by 
the National Program. At the December 2004 Cophenhagen European Council meeting, it 
was decided to launch negotiations with Turkey and establish a timetable for accession 
(European Commission, 2004b).  
Turkey took a number of important steps towards this end, such as major review of the 
Turkish Constitution that thirty-four articles have recently been amended. The package of 
constitutional amendments covers a wide range of issues, such as improving human rights, 
strengthening the rule of law and restructuring of democratic institutions. In addition, 
numerous reform measures have been adopted in economic framework in line with the 
National Program. Even though the membership negotiations has been opened, great 
uncertainties continue to prevail about whether Turkey will be able to achieve its goal of 
accession to the EU. Some of these are in political grounds whilst the greatest uncertainty 
might be whether EU governments and societies are willing to accept a large but 
nonetheless a Muslim country as part of the EU.  
In the case of EU membership, massive population of Turkey will make it the second largest 
country of the EU following Germany, whilst the population projections state that it will 
likely be the largest by 2025. Togther with Germany, they will account for almost 30 percent 
of the EU’s population and the EU will then have seven large countries, that is, Germany, 
France, Italy, the UK, Poland, Spain and Turkey.  
Referring to its massive population, Turkey will certainly impact strongly on the political 
dynamics both among large members and within the EU as a whole. At this point, we find it 
interesting to examine the likely direct impact of Turkey’s EU membership on the European 
Council, Commision and Parliament. Table 2 sets out voting weights by population share in 
an EU-25, EU-27 and probable EU-28. 
                                                 
3 EU-10 countries are; Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, 
Estaonia, Poland and Hungary. 
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Countries 2003 2015 2025 2050 
France 60144 62841 64165 64230 
Germany 82476 82497 81959 79145 
Italy 57423 55507 52939 44875 
Poland 38587 38173 37337 33004 
Spain 41060 41167 40369 37336 
UK 59251 61275 63287 66166 
Turkey 71325 82150 88995 97759 
Total EU-25 454187 456876 454422 431241 
Total EU-27 484418 485692 481837 454559 
Total EU-28 (incl Turkey) 555743 567842 570832 552318 
Turkey as % of EU-28 12.8 14.4 15.5 17.7 
Source: Adapted by the author from UN population forecasts 
Table 1. Population projections for Turkey and selective EU countries, 2003-2050 
 
Countries Share in EU-25, 2004 Share in EU-27, 2007 Share in EU-28, 2015 
 V.W Seats V.W Seats V.W Seats 
Germany 18.1 99 16.9 98 14.5 82 
France 13.2 78 12.9 78 11 64 
Italy 12.6 78 11.4 78 9.7 64 
UK 13 78 12.6 78 10.7 64 
Spain 9 54 8.4 54 7.2 44 
Poland 8.4 54 7.8 54 6.7 44 
Turkey -- -- -- -- 14.4 82 
Source: Adapted by the author from UN World Population Division, World Population Prospects (2002) 
-V.W: Voting weights 
Table 2. Voting weights and number of seats in the European Parliament 
Assuming the EU agrees on ‘double-majority’ system of voting in the constitution, EU 
decisions will need a majority of two countries and population. In an EU-28, no proposal 
could be passed without the support of at least 15 member countries. In such a system, no 
single state can dominate; where population size has more power is through the ability to 
block decisions. If the threshold is set at 60 percent, then in the EU-25, Germany together 
with the UK and France can block decisions (with 44.3 percent of total population, or with 
Italy instead of the UK making 43.9 percent), though they cannot achieve this in an EU-28 
(where they have 36.2 percent of population) unless the population majority is set to 65 
percent (Hughes, 2004). 
In the case of a EU-28, each of Turkey and Germany will have around 14.5 per cent of the 
vote. Even though they will be strong players, they can not block proposals even together 
but with a third large country. The largest 5 countries in an EU-28 will account for 60.3 per 
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cent of the vote by population. This is only 3.4 per cent higher than the share of the ‘big 4’ 
countries in the EU-25 (where they have 56.9 per cent of the vote). So, Turkey will be an 
important powerful player and will add to the already complex set of alliances and blocking 
combinations that are possible. But in an EU-28, despite its size, it does not add strongly to 
the dominance of large countries. As the debate on voting power in the constitution shows, 
questions of power and votes are highly politically sensitive and negotiations for Turkey’s 
accession will not be simple. 
Moreover, given its size, Turkey will have a large impact on the European Parliament. 
Assuming the EU decides to keep a limit of 732 seats in the parliament, then all countries’ 
allocations have to be reduced to avoid the accession of Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria 
adding 149 seats (99 (same as Germany), 33 and 17, respectively). If there was a simple 
proportionate reduction across all countries on the allocation of seats, Germany and Turkey 
would have 82 seats and 11.2 per cent share of the vote each (down from 13.5 per cent), 
France, Italy and the UK would have 64 seats representing 8.7 per cent of the vote each 
(down from 10.6 per cent), and Spain and Poland would have 44 seats and 6.0 per cent of the 
vote (down from 7.3 per cent). 
From the economic perspective, the most important fact about Turkey is its low purchasing 
power parity (PPP) adjusted per capita income which is almost equal to those of Bulgaria 
and Romania but more complicated, and expected to create economic consequences for the 
EU. What is different from the current EU is that its largest members today – Germany, 
France, Italy and the UK – also have the largest economies. Political and economic 
dominance go together. However, this is not the case for Turkey. Moreover, Turkey’s 
biggest problems are its high unemployment and inflation rates as well as current account 
deficit. But we should emphasize the high GDP growth and GDP per capita growth rates 
that can be accepted as indicators of good performance and promise of development in the 
near future. 
From Turkey’s perspective, the EU accession will grant numerous benefits. Actually, Turkey 
would not have to wait very long to start reaping the benefits of an eventual EU accession. 
With the opening of EU accession negotiations in October 2005, Turkey is likely to attract 
larger sums of FDI in the near future, which has already been experienced in the banking 
sector since 2005. The opening of EU negotiations acted as a strong signal that Turkey will 
eventually become a full member of the EU and would assure foreign investors that the 
Turkish economy will follow a stable growth path for the foreseeable future and the legal 
and judicial environment will improve across all relevant areas of the common acquis.  
2.1 Why does EU opposes to Turkey's membership? 
While the EU is working with Turkey to help it move forward in its probable EU 
membership, there are some who are concerned about this progress. Some of the main 
issues pointed out by the opposers can be summarised as follows: 
First, Turkey's culture and values are different from those of the EU as a whole. In fact, 
Turkey's 99.8 percent Muslim population is too different from Christian-based Europe. 
However, the EU introduces this case in a very political manner and explains that the EU is 
not a religion-based organization and that 12 million Muslims currently live throughout the 
EU, Moreover, Turkey is a secular (a non-religion-based government) state, whilst needs to 
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"Substantially improve respect for the rights of non-Muslim religious communities to meet 
European standards."  
Secondly, another argument is based on the geographical fact that Turkey is mostly not in 
Europe, thus it should not become part of the EU. If that is the case what could be said about 
Cyprus? Is the island geographically located in Europe? This brings us to the third issue of 
Turkey's non-recognition of Republic of Cyprus, which is a full-fledged member of the EU 
since 2004. Additionally, many are concerned about the rights of Kurds in Turkey. The 
Kurdish people have limited human rights and there are accounts of genocidal activities that 
need to stop for Turkey to be considered for the EU membership.  
Thirdly, Turkey is receiving considerable assistance from its European neighbors as well as 
from the EU. The EU has allocated billions and is expected to allocate billions of euros in 
funding for projects to help invest in a stronger Turkey that may one day become a member 
of the EU. The low per-capita income of the Turkish population is also of concern since the 
economy of Turkey as a new EU member might have a negative effect on the EU as a whole. 
From the EU’s perspective, the most probable economic objections to Turkey's full 
membership can be listed as: (i) Turkey will receive a significant part of the EC structural 
funds and will impose an additional burden on countries that are major contributors to the 
Community budget; (ii) the Turkish economy is not mature enough for the single market, 
and the Turkish industry is not competitive with that of the EU, and (iii) there is also a 
problem of free movement of the labor force as Turkey will lead to a huge arrival of Turkish 
immigrants into the EU countries, particularly Germany. 
Finally, some are concerned that Turkey's large population would alter the balance of power 
in the EU as discussed in the previous section of this chapter. After all, Germany's 
population, which is the largest country in the EU is only at 82 million and declining. 
Turkey would be the second largest country and perhaps eventually the largest with its 
much higher growth rate in the EU. Thus it would have considerable influence in the 
European Parliament. 
3. Literature survey 
Over the last decade several papers examined the relationship between foreign ownership 
and bank performances as well as the differences among foreign owned versus domestic 
banks. Even though there is an established literature on identifying the effects of FDI 
inflows and access to foreign capital on the productivity of non-financial institutions, such 
as Gorg & Greenaway (2004) and Moran et al. (2005); empirical research analysing the 
impact of increased FDI on bank productivity is very narrow. Studies by Classens et al. 
(2001); Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2000); Berger & Humphey (1997) and Berger et al. (2000) 
examined performance of domestic and foreign-owned banks offering little insight on how 
foreign existence influences bank productivity. Moreover, several studies in the literature 
test the impact of foreign ownership on bank efficiency, mainly using ownership dummies 
(see for instance, Lensink et al., 2008), although none can be found on the foreign 
ownership-bank productivity relationship. 
A channel of the literature works on analysing sources of bank productivity differences 
across a sample of countries mainly focusing on country-specific economic, demographic 
and technological conditions (Chaffai et al, 2001); financial regulatory environment (Delis et 
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al, 2008), success or failure of policy initiatives (Casu et al., 2004), and economic liberalization 
or financial deregulation (Berg et al, 1992; Dogan & Fausten, 2003; Grifell-Tatje & Lovell, 
1997; Isik & Hassan, 2003; Mukerjee et al, 2001; Tirtiroglu et al., 2005; Worthington, 1999). 
The general conclusion reached by Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas (2000); Cavallo & Rossi (2002); 
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002); Pasiouras et al. (2007); Lensink et al. (2008) and Pasiouras (2008) is 
that country-specific environmental conditions and deregulatory policies are important 
factors on both bank productivity and efficiency.  
In connection to the global advantage hypothesis introduced by Berger et al. (2000); Aitken 
& Harrison (1999) proposed FDI as a factor negatively affecting domestic bank productivity. 
They stated that foreign banks may have a competition advantage due to their better 
resources and technologies resulting in greater market share with lower interest margins 
and risk premiums in a country than its domestic counterparts. 
Another argument in the literature is on the cherry-picking aspect, i.e. foreign banks may 
magnify the risk profile of their domestic counterparts by using their financial power to pick 
the most rewarding features of the domestic market, and force domestic banks to do more 
risky business. Furthermore, domestic bank competitiveness and efficiency is achieved 
before rather than after the entry of foreign banks into the sector. In other words, efficiency 
is a pre-condition rather than a result of foreign bank entry. Berger et al. (2000) focused on 
this issue specifically examining the major industrialised countries and investigated whether 
the ‘home-field advantage hypothesis’ or the ‘global-advantage hypothesis’ holds.  
This isuue has been examined by Hymer (1976) in an earlier study and illustrated that 
foreign firms are likely to face competitive disadvantages relative to national firms. This is 
due to the fact that domestic firms have the general advantage of better information about 
their country’s economy, language, laws and politics. This leads to the hypothesis that 
foreign banks suffer more from a bad institutional framework in the host country than 
domestic banks. Foreigners and nationals may receive different treatment from 
governments, consumers and suppliers. In countries with a solid institutional framework, 
the impact of foreign ownership on bank efficiency will be less negative or more positive 
than in countries where the institutional framework is bad.  
In another study, Mian (2006) develops a theoretical model on the effect of institutional 
distance on foreign bank behaviour. He assumes that institutional distance between the 
home country and the host country will cause higher informational, agency, or enforcement 
costs for foreign banks operating abroad. This issue has also been investigated by Stein 
(2002) who stated that technologies such as derivative contracts, ATM networks and 
Internet banking allow banks to interact efficiently with customers over long distances as 
well as improving the ability of senior headquarters managers to monitor junior managers 
working at distant locations.  
In the case of US banking sector, Hancock et al. (1999) suggested that large financial 
institutions dominate electronic payments processing due to information-based scale 
economies. Moreover, Berger & Mester (2003) confirmed the hypothesis that technological 
progress allows banks to offer wider varieties of services and banks engaging in merger 
activity had the greatest gains in profit productivity. This suggests that merger and 
acquisitions may allow foreign banks an opportunity to apply technological innovations in 
host countries. 
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In the case of Turkey, changing economic and financial environment attracted attention of 
researchers.4 Oral & Yolalan (1990) computed operating efficiency and profitability of bank 
branches and demonstrated service-efficient bank branches as the most profitable. In 
another study, Zaim (1995) evaluated the effects of liberalization policies on efficiency of 
Turkish commercial banks during the period of 1981 and 1990 and found that financial 
liberalization had a positive effect on both the technical and the allocative efficiencies, and 
public banks were more efficient than private counterparts. Similarly, Denizer, Dinc, & 
Tarimcilar (2000) examined the bank efficiency during the pre and post-liberalization 
environment and investigated the scale effects on efficiency by ownership covering the 
1970-1994 period. Findings suggested that liberalization programs were followed by an 
observable decline in efficiency and that the Turkish banking system had a serious scale 
problem due to macroeconomic instability.  
Furthermore, Yildirim (2002) analysed efficiency performance of Turkish banks over the 
1988-1999 period. The empirical results suggested that over the sample period both pure 
technical and scale efficiency measures showed a great variation, the sector could not 
achieve sustained efficiency gains and that the trend in the performance scores suggested a 
strong impact of macroeconomic conditions on the efficiency measures. Consistent with 
Denizer et al. (2000), Yildirim concluded that the sector suffered mainly from scale 
inefficiency due to decreasing return to scale (DRS). Confirming these findings Isik & 
Hassan (2002) indicated that the dominant source of inefficiency in Turkish banking was 
due to technical inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency, which was mainly attributed 
to diseconomies on scale. The results suggested that the heterogeneous characteristics of 
banks have significant impact on efficiency.  
Yolalan (1996) used financial ratios to analyze the efficiency of the Turkish commercial 
banks over the period 1988-1995. The results showed that foreign banks were the most 
efficient group, followed by private and public banks respectively. Mercan, Reisman, 
Yolalan, & Emel (2003) introduced a financial performance index on Turkish banks over the 
1989-99 period, which allowed for observing effects of scale and mode of ownership on bank 
behaviour. They applied DEA to select fundamental financial ratios for the period of 1989-
1999. The results showed that banks that were taken over by a regulatory government 
agency perform poorly with respect to their DEA performance index values. 
4. The data 
The data for this study comprise the population of 17 commercial banks operating in Turkey 
and concerns the 1992-2008 period, consisting of 272 observations, as available from the 
Bank Association of Turkey (BAT). The sample period is chosen as it covers financial 
structural changes, the most recent wave of FDI and opening up of EU negotiations. 
Selection of inputs and outputs is guided by the objectives of the Turkish banking system, 
where commercial banks act as intermediaries with the objective of collecting deposits. 
Therefore, we use the Intermediation approach proposed by Sealey & Lindley (1977), similar 
to many other studies, Zaim (1995), Kraft & Tirtiroglu (1998), Rezvanian & Mehdian (2002), 
                                                 
4 There are couple of studies that analyse efficiency of Turkish banks applying DEA such as Oral and 
Yolalan (1990), Altunbas et al. (1994c), Zaim (1995), Denizer et al. (2000), and Isik and Hassan (2002). 
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Isik & Hassan (2002, 2003) and Havrylchyk (2006), where total assets, total deposits and total 
expenses (inclusing personnel expenses) are considered as inputs used to produce total 
loans and interest income as outputs. Table 3 introduces the sample characteristics. 
 
Year Domestic Foreign Invested Total Observations 
1992-1996 17 0 17 68 
1996-2000 17 0 17 68 
2000-2004 15 2 17 68 
2004-2008 8 9 17 68 
Total 57 11 68 272 
Approach Outputs Inputs   
 Total loans Total assets   
Intermediation Interest income Total expenses   
  Total Deposits   
FDI Information  
Year Domestic Bank Aquirer 
Origin of 
Aquirer 
Stake Bought 
(%) 
2001 Demirbank HSBC UK 100 
2002 Koc Bank UniCredit Italy 50 
2005 YKB UniCredit/Kocbank Italy-Turkey 57 
 TEB BNP Paribas France 50 
 Disbank Fortis Belgium 89 
 Garanti Bankasi GE Capital Corporation USA 26 
 Finansbank 
National Bank of 
Greece 
Greece 46 
2006 Denizbank Dexia Bank Belgium 75 
 Sekerbank BTA Kazakhstan 34 
 Akbank Citigroup USA 20 
Table 3. Sample characteristics 
5. Methodology: DEA-Malmquist index 
The nonparametric DEA-Malmquist index can be estimated by exploiting the relationship of 
distance functions to the technical efficiency measures developed by Farrell (1957). This 
technique is a “primal” index of productivity change. Therefore, it does not require cost or 
revenue shares to aggregate inputs and outputs, and was introduced to the literature by 
Caves et al, (1982a). In order to calculate Malmquist index, it is first required to define 
distance functions with respect to two different time periods, such as: 
     1 1 1 1, inf : , /t t t t t toD y y S          (1) 
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Where Do is the distance function at time t with t , Input vector in time t+1 and ty , output 
vector in time t+1. Technical efficiency is indicated by  and production technology by St. 
The distance function in equation (1) measures the maximal proportional change in outputs 
required to make  1 1,t ty   feasible in relation to technology at t (Fare, Grosskopf, Norris 
& Zhang, referred to as FGNZ, 1994). Then, the Malmquist index reference to technology t is 
defined by CCD (1982a) as: 
 
 
 
1 1,
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t t t
ot
CCD t t t
o
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M
D y
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  (2) 
whereas for period t+1 it is: 
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In order to avoid choosing “an arbitrary benchmark”, the output based Malmquist 
productivity index, 0M , is specified to be the geometric mean of equation (3). Then: 
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Following FGNZ (1994), the above formula can be decomposed into technical efficiency 
change and technological change thus: 
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 (5) 
 
The first figure in parenthesis measures the efficiency change, whereas the second one 
represents the technical change component of the index. There is productivity growth if Mo 
> 0, stagnation if Mo = 0, and productivity decline if Mo <0. Given the fact that the 
Malmquist decomposition of FGNZ (1994) is based on CRS reference technology, no scale 
effect could be identified. Thus, FGNZ’ catch-up component from the combination of 
efficiency change and scale efficiency change is inappropriate. In order to overcome this 
limitation Ray & Desli (1997) developed a model which measures the correct productivity 
change by the ratio of constant returns to scale (CRS) distance functions even though the 
technology is variable returns to scale (VRS). The technological change component based on 
the VRS distance function could affect scale efficiency change while technical change 
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remains unaffected. The scale efficiency change (SE) component is defined by the distance 
function as: 
     
,
,
,
t t t
CRSt t t
t t t
VRS
D y
SE y
D y
    (6) 
where, CRS represents reference technology with a constant returns to scale assumption and 
VRS a variable returns to scale assumption. However, Fare et al. (1997b) were the first to 
criticise the Ray & Desli (1997) model as to the fact that it cannot measure scale efficiency 
change (S) since each component uses only single period technology (Lovell, 2001). 
Therefore, the equation has been extended to incorporate time and the scale efficiency 
change factor.  
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Then the Malmquist productivity index (Mo) can be decomposed into technical efficiency 
change and technological change written in the first paranthesis and scale efficiency change 
in the latter as: 
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where D0 is the distance function with input vectors of Xt and Xt+1 for periods t and t+1 and 
output vectors of Yt and Yt+1 for periods t and t+1, respectively. DVRSt and DVRSt+1 represent 
technologies with variable returns to scale at periods t and t+1 and SEt and SEt+1 are 
variables identifying scale efficiency change at periods t and t+1. An improvement in TC is 
considered as a shift in the frontier. Also, scale efficiency change (SEC) component has been 
subject to a number of criticisms (see Casu et al., 2004), mainly in terms of the role of 
constant returns vs. variable returns to scale frontiers. However, there seems to be 
consensus that the Malmquist index is correctly measured by the constant returns to scale 
distance function, even when technology exhibits variable returns to scale. 
6. Empirical findings 
Throughout this section, we present input oriented Malmquist Index findings obtained by 
the DEAP software introduced by Coelli (1996), using a panel of Turkish commercial banks 
with a total of 272 observations over the period 1992-2008. As aforementioned, TFPC scores 
are decomposed into TC, TEC, PEC and SEC components. At this stage, it may be 
questionable to assume that all banks are coming from the same legal and business 
environment and pool domestic and foreign invested banks together. As a robustness check, 
we performed parametric (ANOVA) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis) 
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tests to check the null hypothesis that all banks come from the same population following 
Isik & Hasan (2002), and Havrylchyk (2006). Results of the tests are presented in Table 4. 
Consistent with Sathye (2001), and Isik & Hassan (2002, 2003) tests could not reject the null 
hypothesis at 1% significance level, thus foreign invetsed and domestic commercial banks 
are from the same sample and it would be appropriate to pull all banks together using a 
common frontier.  
 
 ANOVA Wilcoxon Krusal-Wallis 
Test statisticsa F (prob>F) z (prob>z) χ2 (prob> χ2) 
Panel A: 1992    
TEC 
0.664 
(0.112) 
0.536 
(0.212) 
0.158 
(0.00) 
TC 
0.749 
(0.230) 
0.344 
(0.032) 
0.208 
(0.00) 
PEC 
0.663 
(0.162) 
0.456 
(0.788) 
0.185 
(0.001) 
SEC 
0.146 
(0.01) 
0.553 
(0.766) 
0.308 
(0.706) 
TFPC 
0.205 
(0.233) 
0.422 
(0.245) 
0.882 
(0.003) 
Panel B: 1997    
TEC 
0.237 
(0.118) 
0.334 
(0.788) 
0.118 
(0.002) 
TC 
0.201 
(0.05) 
0.138 
(0.03) 
0.127 
(0.005) 
PEC 
0.234 
(0.046) 
0.179 
(0.233) 
0.873 
(0.110) 
SEC 
0.115 
(0.344) 
0.788 
(0.566) 
0.432 
(0.215) 
TFPC 
0.075 
(0.803) 
0.236 
(0.455) 
0.576 
(0.012) 
Panel C: 2003    
TEC 
0.654 
(0.01) 
0.765 
(0.212) 
0.321 
(0.056) 
TC 
0.655 
(0.01) 
0.466 
(0.312) 
0.182 
(0.213) 
PEC 
1.115 
(0.236) 
0.895 
(0.023) 
0.193 
(0.165) 
SEC 
2.172 
(0.119) 
0.896 
(0.024) 
0.466 
(0.344) 
TFPC 
0.931 
(0.346) 
0.269 
(0.0342) 
0.877 
(0.313) 
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 ANOVA Wilcoxon Krusal-Wallis 
Test statisticsa F (prob>F) z (prob>z) χ2 (prob> χ2) 
Panel D: 2008    
TEC 
0.030 
(0.788) 
0.0988 
(0.431) 
0.932 
(0.122) 
TC 
0.567 
(0.345) 
0.677 
(0.002) 
0.244 
(0.236) 
PEC 
0.054 
(0.536) 
0.0478 
(0.201) 
0.788 
(0.366) 
SEC 
2.33 
(0.113) 
0.780 
(0.023) 
0.780 
(0.234) 
TFPC 
0.476 
(0.532) 
0.762 
(0.011) 
0.566 
(0.452) 
a Tets methodology follows Elyasiani & Mehdian (1992). 
All tests applied with ownership as grouping variable. The ANOVA is a parametric test that test the 
null hypothesis that foreign invested and domestic banks have the same mean; Wilcoxon Rank-Sum, 
Kruskal-Wallis are non-parametric tests that test the shift in the location of the distribution. 
The numbers in paranthesis are the p-values associated with the relevant test. 
Notes: TEC: technical efficiency changes; TC: technological change; PEC: pure efficinency change; SEC: 
scale efficiency change; TFPC: total factor productivity change. 
Table 4. Summary of parametric and non-parametric tests 
6.1 DEA-Malmquist findings: Country level analysis 
Table 5 presents the Malmquist TFPC estimates applying the intermediation approach by 
Sealey & Lindley (1977). In the last column, if the value is greater than one it indicates 
productivity growth, while a value less than one indicates a TFP decline over the relevant 
period. We report TFPC decomposed into TEC, TC, PEC and SEC as in Casu et al. (2004), 
Isik & Hassan (2003), Delis et al. (2008), and Dogan & Fausten (2003). This helps to isolate 
contributions of each component on TFPC. The annual results are geometric means, and 
indices of change are calculated relative to the previous year using successive reference 
technologies. If there is increasing returns to scale (IRS) where SEC >1 than it is optimal to 
expand the scale of production in order to increase productivity, whilst decrease the 
production level if there is DRS, i.e. SEC<1 (Isik & Hassan, 2003). 
The results suggests that the average bank experienced a productivity growth of 0.6 per 
cent, comprising an average technical efficiency increase of 2.4 per cent, a slight average 
technological decline of 1.8 per cent and an average scale efficiency progress of 1.9 per cent 
over the 1992-2008 period. TFPC vary across the sample period with a negative change of 
40.9 per cent from 1992-93 to 1993–94 attributable to the economic contraction due to the 
1994 crisis, which affected the Turkish banking sector badly. In contrast, TEC experienced 
only 27.7 per cent decline over the same period. Followingly, an immediate recovery of 30.3 
per cent is observed in TFPC during 1994–95, while the impact of the 1994 crisis affected 
TEC by a negative change of 16.1 per cent over the same period. We monitored frequent 
fluctuations in the TFPC scores of the banks under analysis with the most devastating 
productivity recessions during 1993–94, 1996-97 and 2000–01. 
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Years TEC TC PEC SEC TFPC 
1992–1993 1.339 0.826 1.027 1.304 1.106 
1993–1994 1.062 0.656 0.962 1.105 0.697 
1994–1995 0.901 1.109 0.947 0.952 1.000 
1995–1996 1.003 1.127 1.001 1.002 1.130 
1996–1997 1.030 0.666 1.041 0.989 0.686 
1997–1998 1.110 0.656 1.117 0.994 0.728 
1998–1999 0.875 0.912 0.946 0.926 0.798 
1999–2000 1.092 1.245 1.069 1.022 1.359 
2000–2001 1.053 0.541 1.012 1.041 0.569 
2001–2002 0.885 1.380 0.863 1.026 1.221 
2002–2003 0.965 1.357 1.011 0.954 1.309 
2003–2004 0.917 1.305 0.968 0.947 1.196 
2004–2005 0.965 1.888 0.984 0.981 1.822 
2005–2006 1.053 0.990 1.113 0.947 1.043 
2007–2007 1.239 0.814 1.045 1.186 1.008 
2007–2008 1.001 1.113 1.000 1.001 1.114 
Mean 1.024 0.982 1.005 1.019 1.006 
Notes: 1 = 100 per cent; TEC: technical efficiency change; TC: technological change; PEC: pure efficiency 
change; SEC: scale efficiency change; TFPC: total factor productivity change.  
Table 5. DEA-Malmquist components, 1992–2008 (1=100 per cent) 
Starting with 1996, banks in the sample experienced a negative TFPC until 1999 followed 
by a one year productivity growth in the 1999-2000 period. We suggest the negative trend 
over 1996-99 period as a contagion effect of Russian crisis in 1998 as it is one of the largest 
trade partners of Turkey. Attributable to the twin crises of 2000-01, TFPC was negative 
which suggests the fact that banks could not cope with the changing economic and 
technological environment that arose from the twin crises and know-how transferred into 
the system by foreign investors; and since then TFPC between any successive years is 
consistently positive. 
The significant positive TFPC starting in 2001-02 period may be correlated with the 
signing of the tough IMF recovery program in 2002, and entry of foreign banks into the 
system, for instance sale of Demirbank to HSBC, and acquisition of Kocbank with 
UniCredito during 2001 and 2002, respectively. In connection with Eller et al. (2005) this 
may be the result of better management of financial resources to high return projects, 
technical progress and better risk diversification of foreign-invested banks. For instance, 
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during 2003-04, the productivity growth (19.6 per cent) was primarily the result of 
technological progress, TC (30.5 per cent) that was partly offset by technical inefficiency 
(8.3 per cent). Taken together, these results suggest that unproductive banks tend to catch 
up with productive banks largely in terms TC as banks experienced recessions in their 
TEC estimates. Over the analysis period, we suggest that the predominant source of TFPC 
is TC confirmed by the significantly positive Pearson and Kendall’s correlation 
coefficients introduced in Table 6. 
 
 TECb TCb PECb SECb TFPCb 
TEC 
p 
k 
 
1.0000*** 
1.0000*** 
    
TC 
p 
k 
 
0.2617*** 
-0.1785** 
 
1.0000*** 
1.0000*** 
   
PEC 
p 
k 
 
0.7114*** 
0.5530*** 
 
-0.0561* 
-0.0383* 
 
1.0000*** 
1.0000*** 
  
SEC 
p 
k 
 
0.5134*** 
0.3793*** 
 
-0.2567** 
-0.1720** 
 
-0.080*** 
-0.0538** 
 
1.0000*** 
1.0000*** 
 
TFPC 
p 
k 
 
0.4253*** 
0.2922** 
 
0.6962*** 
0.5292*** 
 
0.4362*** 
0.2891*** 
 
0.0561*** 
0.0367*** 
 
1.0000*** 
1.0000*** 
a Parametric ordinary Pearson (p) correlation coefficients – first rows of each cell. Kendall’s (k) 
correlation coefficients–second rows of each cell. 
b TEC= Technical efficiency change, TC= Technological change, PEC= Pure efficiency change, SEC= 
Scale efficiency change, TFPC= Total factor productivity change,  
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Table 6. Pearson and Kendall’s rank order correlation coefficients  
The null hypothesis is that the correlation coefficient between two variables is zero. In all 
cases, the Pearson (p) coefficient results confirm all the relationships found with the 
Kendall’s (k) in the direction (positive or negatave) and significance. All of the DEA-
Malmquist decomposed components, namely, TEC, TC, PEC and SEC, are positively 
correlated with TFPC (pTFPC-TEC=0.4253, pTFPC-TC=0.6962, pTFPC-PEC=0.4362, pTFPC-SEC=0.0561, 
respectively). TC and PEC are highly positively and statistically significantly associated with 
TFPC indicating the dominant effect of technological change and managerial efficiency 
change on the overall productivity scores of banks. TEC is more related to PEC and SEC 
than to TC (pTEC-PEC=0.7114, pTEC-SEC=0.5134, pTEC-TC=0.2617, respectively), confirming the 
dominant effect of managerial efficiency and scale efficiency in determining the technical 
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efficiency of the Turkish commercial banks. This finding also confirms a similar statement 
by Isik & Hassan (2002).  
It can be stated that, high-tech investments played a crucial role in the positive TC of banks 
and also on productivity growth over the analysis period. We suggest this as the result of 
rapid spread of Automatic Telling Machines (ATMs), Point on Sale (POS) terminals and 
increased number of bank cards issued as a reflection of the widespread acceptance gained 
by these products. High-tech investments brought into the system by foreign-invested banks 
is suggested to play a crucial role on positive TC shifting the frontier upwards. 
Moreover, significantly positive and high managerial efficiency (PEC) since 2005-06 period 
can be attributable to the argument that foreign invested banks may increase the quality of 
human capital in a banking system, either by importing high skilled bank managers to work 
in their branches or by training the local employees (Lensink & Hermes, 2004). The DEA-
Malmquist results also indicated a trade-off between managerial efficiency and technical 
progress over the period of analysis, which could be explained by the fact that technology 
transfer through FDI takes time to materialise as resources have to be devoted to learning 
during which time banks seek ways of attaining gains in terms of managerial or scale 
efficiency. 
6.2 DEA-Malmquist findings: Bank level analysis 
Our findings in Table 7 suggest that over the 1992-2008 period, foreign-invested banks 
achieved higher average TFP growth than average of 0.6 per cent for the whole commercial 
banks in the sample. The highest average achievements in TFPC are experienced by foreign-
invested Akbank (investment by Citibank), YKB-UniCredito (earlier Kocbank), Sekerbank 
(investment by BTA) and Garanti bank (investment by GECC), which are well above the 
average. Koçbank presented the highest average productivity growth (39 per cent) - prior to 
the acqusition by YKB. Looking at the figures, we observe that Kocbank experienced the 
highest average TFPC and TC over the analysis period.This can be attributable to its high 
level of performance from 2000-01 to 2002-03. This period coincides with the point in time of 
its merger with the Italian bank, UniCredito, in 2002.  
Annual TFPC scores of Dışbank have been the most volatile of all. It has presented a pattern 
of great sensitivity to macroeconomic and policy changes in the country, which can be a sign 
that it was not as powerful a bank as were its counterparts under focus. It’s most recent 
recovery (31 per cent) was identified after its sale to one of the most reliable banks of 
Europe, namely Fortis Bank of Belgium, in 2005. Contrary to the productivity growth 
experienced during various periods, Kocbank and Disbank experienced productivity decline 
during the financial crisis periods in the country. We attribute high productivity scores of 
foreign-invested banks in Turkey to their high level of TC compared to domestic banks. This 
may suggest that foreign banks which have invested in local Turkish banks have succeeded 
in utilizing their superior technology and expertise resulting in productivity growth higher 
than the market average and domestic banks. 
The same is applicable for TEC estimates but this time adding Finansbank to the list. In 
general, TEC results indicate that foreign-invested banks are relatively more efficient (higher 
postive TEC) than their domestic counterparts consistent with the findings of Hasan & 
Hunter (1996), Mahajan et al. (1996), DeYoung & Nolle (1996) and Chang et al. (1998).  
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Bank TEC TC PEC SEC TFPC 
Ziraat Bankası 0.982 0.992 0.947 1.037 0.974 
Halk Bankası 1.046 0.985 1.002 1.043 1.031 
Vakıflar Bankası 1.090 1.029 1.044 1.045 1.122 
Alternatif Bank 0.985 0.951 0.985 1.000 0.937 
Anadolu Bank 0.984 0.811 0.984 1.000 0.789 
Şekerbank-BTA 1.062 1.005 1.040 1.021 1.067 
Tekstil Bank 1.000 0.991 0.993 1.007 0.991 
TEB-BNP Paribas 1.008 0.989 1.003 1.005 0.997 
Garanti Bankası-GECC 1.041 1.020 1.022 1.019 1.062 
Işbankası 1.040 1.015 1.004 1.036 1.056 
YKB-UniCredito 1.036 1.002 0.997 1.039 1.038 
Akbank-Citibank 1.064 1.001 1.038 1.026 1.065 
Koçbank-Unicredit/YKB 1.031 1.347 1.030 1.002 1.390 
Dışbank-Fortis 1.000 0.951 1.000 1.000 0.951 
Demirbank-HSBC 1.012 0.981 0.993 1.019 0.993 
Denizbank-Dexia Bank 1.000 0.777 1.000 1.000 0.777 
Finansbank-NBG 1.031 0.952 1.000 1.031 0.981 
Mean 1.024 0.982 1.005 1.019 1.006 
Notes: TEC: technical efficiency changes; TC: technological change; PEC: pure efficinency change; SEC: 
scale efficiency change; TFPC: total factor productivity change. 
Table 7. DEA-Malmquist decomposed components of individual banks, 1992–2008 
Another comment was suggested by Havrylchyk (2006), who emphasize that foreign banks 
acquire more efficient banks in a banking industry, whilst fail to enhance their efficiency 
further.  
In terms of public ownership, a noteworthy aspect of public banks is related to credit. As a 
result of the political pressure in Turkey, public banks - Ziraat Bankası, Halk Bankası and 
Vakıflar Bankası - issued loans more easily than their private counterparts. This helped to 
increase their level of output making them appear efficient and productive. However, this 
may not be the case on a risk-adjusted basis, as public banks carry a large number of non-
performing loans. If adjustments to their outputs were made to reflect loan losses, public 
banks might in fact be found to be less efficient than private banks under examination. 
Nevertheless, lack of detailed data on bad loans of public banks prevents an in-depth 
examination of this hypothesis.  
www.intechopen.com
Towards the European Union – Impact of  
FDI and Technological Change on Turkish Banking 
 
191 
Table 8 presents the pre and post FDI technological change scores of foreign invested banks. 
Estimates highlighted with bold represents the period of post-FDI. It is observed that except 
from Denizbank, all foreign invested private banks in Turkey have experienced productivity 
growth during the pre-FDI periods. This supports the argument that efficiency or 
productivity is a pre condition to FDI and foreign investors target good performing banks to 
invest. 
 
 1992-2000 2000-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
Sekerbank 0.933 1.254 1.274 1.07 0.823 0.999 
TEB 0.905 1.245 1.454 1.008 0.766 1.017 
Garanti Bankası 0.994 1.190 1.449 1.028 0.773 1.102 
YKB 0.945 1.196 1.333 1.031 0.783 1.07 
Akbank 0.931 1.369 1.314 1.06 0.839 1.065 
Kocbank 0.981 1.182 1.262 - - - 
Dışbank 0.991 0.999 1.243 1.104 0.89 1.002 
Demirbank 0.945 1.099 1.237 1.101 0.904 0.999 
Denizbank 0.866 1.033 1.3633 0.442 0.773 1.045 
Finansbank 0.932 1.095 1.228 1.081 0.826 1.003 
Numbers in bold represents the post-FDI periods. 
Table 8. Pre and post-FDI technological change of foreign invested banks 
7. Conclusions 
Employing the input oriented DEA-Malmquist model, we estimate the total factor 
productivity change scores of 17 Turkish commercial banks over the period 1992–2008 
period to study the impact of foreign ownership on total factor productivity change and 
technological change scores of Turkish banking sector. Over the years under study, 
empirical results indicate that the productivity scores of the industry consistently fell over 
the crises years. The mean productivity estimates that we find for foreign invested banks in 
general are higher than those of domestic banks. 
We also decompose the productivity change scores (TFPC) into its technical efficiency 
change (TEC), technological change (TC), pure efficiency change (PEC) and scale efficiency 
change (SEC) components. Overall, the decomposed figures indicate that the most 
significant factor on the TFPC scores is the TC component. The major investments in high 
tech bank operations shifted the frontier upward, in particular after the entry of foreign 
banks in the sector. This is due to the fact that foreign involvement created pressure on the 
Turkish banks as a result of increased competition and forced them to diminish their costs. 
In particular, Demirbank, which was sold to HSBC in 2001, experienced massive 
productivity growth in the post-FDI period. Despite its beneficial effects and increased trend 
since 2005, recorded FDI inflows to Turkey have been exceptionally low compared with 
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those of the central and east European countries. The main FDI challenges facing Turkey are 
determining why FDI inflows have remained so low and how Turkey can increase the 
inflows to desirable levels.  
In particular, stability and trust made Turkey an attracting market for foreign investors 
giving rise to further economic growth during the recent years. In this respect, Turkey with 
an increasing population, increasing per capita income and having an advantage of 
geographical location connecting Europe and Middle East is expected to be a further magnet 
for foreign investors. Moreover, Turkey is in the EU accession process and Turkish banks 
are in general smaller in size compared to European counterparts, making them easy to be 
taken over. Also, the flexibility in the Turkish Banking Law treats both domestic and foreign 
banks the same and does not put limitations on the share of foreign ownership. All of these 
important issues can be suggested as the key factors boosting up FDI in the Turkish banking 
sector.  
From the economic perspective, it can be suggested that Turkey’s accession to the EU should 
be related to its size, per capita income, and dependence on agriculture. For the EU, these 
three factors combine to create a huge immigration potential if migration is let free. 
Moreover, these factors indicate that Turkey may become the largest recipient of transfers 
from the EU budget due to its large population, at least under the present rules and policies. 
As a result of these factors, Turkey will face further challenges from the current EU member 
countries. Given the fact that its size is almost as big as the total of new member countries 
(EU-12), Turkey as a single country will have strong voting rights in the European Council. 
This is a big question mark in the EU’s mind whether to approve Turkey’s accession or not. 
8. References 
Aitken, B. J. & Harrison, A. E. (1999). Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela. American Economic Review, American 
Economic Association, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 605-618. 
Altunbas, Y., Molyneux, P., & Murphy, N. (1994c). Privatization, efficiency and public 
ownership in Turkey – An analysis of the banking industry 1991–1993. 
Unpublished working paper, Institute of European Finance. 
Aysan, A.F. & Ceyhan, S.P. (2008). What determines the banking sector performance in 
globalized financial markets? The case of Turkey, Physica A, No. 387, pp. 1593–1602. 
BAT: Quarterly Statistics by Banks, Banks Association of Turkey, various years 
http://www.tbb.org.tr 
Berg, S., Forsund, F. & Jansen, E. (1992). Malmquist indices of productivity growth during 
the deregulation of Norwegian banking, 1980–1989. Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 94, pp. 211–228. 
Berger, A. & Humphrey, D. (1997). Efficiency of Financial Institutions: International Survey 
and Directions for Future Research. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 98, 
No.2, pp. 175–212. 
Berger, A.N. & Mester, L.J. (2003). Explaining the dramatic changes in performance of US 
banks: technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 12, pp. 57-95. 
www.intechopen.com
Towards the European Union – Impact of  
FDI and Technological Change on Turkish Banking 
 
193 
Berger, A.N., & Mester, L.J. (1997). Inside the black box: What explains differences in the 
efficiencies of financial institutions?. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 21, pp. 895–
947. 
Berger, A.N., Deyoung, R., Genay, H. & Udell, G.F. (2000). Globalization of Financial 
Institutions: Evidence from Cross-Border Banking Performance. Brookings-Wharton 
Papers on Financial Services, pp. 23-120 
Bonin, J.P., Hasan, I., & Wachtel, P. (2005). Bank performance, efficiency and ownership in 
transition countries. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 29, pp. 31–53. 
Casu, B., Girardone, C. & Molyneux, P. (2004). Productivity Change in European Banking: A 
Comparison of Parametric and Non-parametric Approaches. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, Vol. 28, No. 10, pp. 2521-2540 
Cavallo, L. & Rossi, S.P.S. (2002). Do environmental variables affect the performance and 
technical efficiency of European banking systems? A parametric analysis using the 
stochastic frontier approach, European Journal of Finance, Vol. 8, pp. 123–146 
Caves, D. W. Christensen, L. R. and Diewert, W. E. (1982b). The Economic Theory of Index 
Numbers and the Measurement of Input, Output and Productivity. Econometrica, 
Vol. 50, pp. 1393–414.  
Chaffai, M. E., Dietch, M., & Lozano-Vivas, A. (2001). Technological and Environmental 
Differences in the European Banking Industries. Journal of Financial Services 
Research, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, pp. 147–62. 
Chang, C., Hasan, I., & Hunter, W. (1998). Efficiency of multinational banks: An empirical 
investigation. Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 689–696. 
Claessens, S., Demirguc-Kunt, A. & Huizinga, H. (2001). How does foreign entry affect 
domestic banking markets?. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 25, pp. 891-911.  
Coelli, T. (1996), A guide to DEAP version 2.1: a Data Envelopment Analysis (Computer 
programme). CEPA Working Paper 96/08, Department of Econometrics, University 
of New England, Armidale, Australia. 
Delis, M.D., Staikouras, C.K. & Varlagas, P. (2008). On the Measurement of Market Power in 
the Banking Industry. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, forthcoming. 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. & Huizinga, H. (2000). Determinants of commercial bank interest 
margins and profitability: Some international evidence. World Bank Economic 
Review, No. 13, pp. 379–408. 
Denizer, C.A., Dinc, M. & Tarimcilar, M. (2000). Measuring banking efficiency in the pre- 
and postliberalisation environment: Evidence from the Turkish banking system. 
World Bank Working Paper, No. 2476. 
DeYoung, R. & Nolle, D.E. (1996). Foreign-owned banks in the US: Earning market share or 
buying it?. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, pp. 622–636. 
Dietsch, M. & Lozano-Vivas, A. (2000). How the environment determines banking 
efficiency: a comparison between French and Spanish industries”. Journal of Banking 
& Finance, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 985–1004. 
Dogan, E. & Fausten, D. (2003). Productivity and technical change in Malaysian banking: 
1989–1998, Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Vol. 10, pp. 205–237 
Eller, M., Haiss, P. & Steiner, K. (2005). Foreign direct investment in the Financial Sector: The 
Engine of Growth, EI Working Paper, No. 69 
www.intechopen.com
 
Technological Change 
 
194 
Elyasiani, E. & Mehdian, S. M. (1992). Productive Efficiency Performance of Minority and 
Nonminority-Owned Banks: A Nonparametric Approach. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 16, pp. 933–948. 
Färe, R, Grosskopf, S., Norris, M. & Zhang, Z. (1994). Productivity Growth, Technical 
Progress, and Efficiency Change in Industrialized Countries. American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84, pp. 66–83. 
Färe, R., Grifell-Tatjé, E., Grosskopf, S. & Lovell, C. A. K. (1997b). Biased Technical Change 
and the Malmquist Productivity Index. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, 
No. 1, pp. 119–27.  
Farrell, M. J. (1957). The Measurement of Productive Efficiency. Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Vol. 120, pp. 253–81. 
Fries, S. & Taci, A. (2002). Banking Reform and Development in Transition Economies. 
EBRD Working Paper, No. 71. 
Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008, World Economic Form: October 31 2007. 
Görg, H. & Greenaway, D. (2004). Much Ado about Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really 
Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?. World Bank Research Observer, Oxford 
University Press, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 171-197. 
Grifell-Tatje, E. & Lovell, C.A.K. (1997). The sources of productivity change in 
Hancock, D., Humphrey, D.B. & Wilcox, J.A. (1999). Cost reductions in electronic payments: 
The roles of consolidation, economies of scale and technical change, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 23, pp. 391-421 
Hasan, I., & Hunter, W.C. (1996). Efficiency of Japanese multinational banks in the United 
States. In: Chen, Andrew H. (Ed.), Research in Finance, Vol. 14. JAI Press, 
Greenwich, CT and London, pp. 157– 173. 
Havrylchyk, O. (2006). Efficiency of the Polish banking industry: foreign versus domestic 
banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 30, pp. 1975-1996 
Hymer, S. (1976). The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign 
Investment. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachussets. 
Isik, I. & Hasan, M.K. (2002). Technical, Scale and Allocative Efficiencies of Turkish Banking 
Industry. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 719-766. 
Isik, I. (2007). Bank ownership and productivity developments: evidence from Turkey. 
Studies in Economics and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 115-139. 
Isik, I., & Hassan, M. K. (2003). Financial disruption and bank productivity: The 1994 
experience of Turkish banks. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 43, 
pp. 291-320. 
Kraft, E. & Tirtiroglu, D. (1998). Bank efficiency in Croatia: A stochastic-frontier analysis. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 282–300. 
Lensink, R., Meesters, A. & Naaborg, I. (2008). Bank efficiency and foreign ownership: do 
good institutions matters?. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 5, pp. 834-44. 
Liu, Z. (2008). Foreign direct investment and technology spillovers: theory and evidence. 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 85, pp. 176-93. 
Lovell, K. (2001). Future Research Opportunities in Efficiency and Productivity Analysis. 
Efficiency Series Paper, No. 1, University of Oviedo Department of Economics. 
Lozano-Vivas, A., Pastor, J. A. & Pastor, J. M. (2002). An Efficiency Comparison of European 
Banking Systems Operating under Different Environmental Conditions. Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, Vol. 18, pp. 59–77. 
www.intechopen.com
Towards the European Union – Impact of  
FDI and Technological Change on Turkish Banking 
 
195 
Mahajan, A., Rangan, N. & Zardkoohi, A. (1996), Cost Structure in Multinational and 
Domestic Banking. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 20, pp. 283-306. 
Malmquist, S. (1953). Index Numbers and Indifference Surfaces. Trabajos de Estatistica, Vol. 4, 
pp. 209–42. 
Mercan, M., Reisman, A., Yolalan, R., & Emel, A.B. (2003). The effect of scale and mode of 
ownership on the financial performance of the Turkish banking sector: Results of a 
DEA based analysis. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 185–202. 
Mian, A., (2006). The limits of foreign lending in poor countries. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
61, pp. 1465–1505. 
Moran, T.H., Graham, E.M. & Blomstrom, M. (Eds) (2005). Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Promote Development?. Peterson Institute of International Economics,Washington, 
DC, May, pp. 440. 
Mukerjee, K., Ray, S.C. & Miller, S.M. (2001). Productivity growth in large US commercial 
banks: the initial post-deregulation experience. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
25, pp. 913-39. 
Oral, M., & Yolalan, R. (1990). An empirical study on measuring operating efficiency and 
profitability of bank branches. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 46, pp. 
282–294. 
Pasiouras, F. (2008). International evidence on the impact of regulations and supervision on 
banks’ technical efficiency: an application of two-stage data envelopment analysis. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 30, pp. 187-223. 
Pasiouras, F., Tanna, S. & Zopounidis, C. (2007). Regulations, supervision, and banks’ cost 
and profit efficiency around the world: a stochastic frontier approach. working 
paper series, 2007.05, University of Bath School of Management, Bath. 
Ray, S. & Desli, E. (1997). Productivity Growth, Technical Progress, and Efficiency Change 
in Industrialized Countries: Comment. American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 5, 
pp. 1033–9. 
Rezvanian, R., & Mehdian, S. (2002). An examination of cost structure and production 
performance of commercial banks in Singapore. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
26, pp. 79–98. 
Sathye, M. (2001). X-efficiency of Australian banking: An empirical investigation. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 25,pp. 613–630. 
Sealey Jr., C.W. & Lindley, J.T. (1977). Inputs, outputs, and a theory of production and cost 
at depository financial institutions. Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, pp. 1251–1266. 
Spanish banking. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 5, pp. 257-264. 
Stein, J. (2002). Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus 
Hierarchical Firms. Journal of Finance, Vol. LVII, No.5, October 2002. 
Steinherr, A., Tukel, A. & Ucer, M. (2004). The Turkish Banking Sector: Challenges and 
Outlook in Transition to EU Membership. Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings, 
No.9. 
Tirtiroglu, D., Daniels, K.N. & Tirtigoglu, E. (2005). Deregulation, Intensity of Competition, 
Industry Evolution, and the Productivity Growth of U.S. Commercial Banks. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 339-360. 
Worthington, A.C. (1999). Malmquist indices of productivity change in Australian financial 
services. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 9, pp. 
303-320. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Technological Change 
 
196 
Yildirim, C. (2002). Evolution of banking efficiency within an unstable macroeconomic 
environment: The case of Turkish commercial banks. Applied Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 
2289-2301. 
Yolalan, R. (1996). Turk Bankacilik Sektoru icin Goreli Mali Performans Olcumu. Turkiye 
Bankalar Birligi Bankacilar Dergisi, Vol. 19, pp. 35-40., 
Zaim, O. (1995). The effect of financial liberalisation on the efficiency of Turkish commercial 
banks. Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 5, pp. 257-264 
www.intechopen.com
Technological Change
Edited by Dr. Aurora Teixeira
ISBN 978-953-51-0509-1
Hard cover, 238 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 11, April, 2012
Published in print edition April, 2012
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
Technological change is today central to the theory of economic growth. It is recognised as an important driver
of productivity growth and the emergence of new products from which consumers derive welfare. It depends
not only on the work of scientists and engineers, but also on a wider range of economic and societal factors,
including institutions such as intellectual property rights and corporate governance, the operation of markets, a
range of governmental policies (science and technology policy, innovation policy, macroeconomic
policy,competition policy, etc.), historical specificities, etc. Given that technology is explicitly taken up in the
strategies and policies of governments and firms, and new actors both in the national and international arenas
become involved, understanding the nature and dynamics of technology is on demand. I anticipate that this
book will decisively contribute in this regard.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Özlem Olgu (2012). Towards the European Union - Impact of FDI and Technological Change on Turkish
Banking, Technological Change, Dr. Aurora Teixeira (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-51-0509-1, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/technological-change/towards-the-european-union-impact-of-fdi-and-
technological-change-in-turkish-banking
© 2012 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This is an open access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
